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RECUSATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES
LESTER B. O1m~rLD*
CHANGE or VENUE DISTINGUISHE
RECUSATION refers to disqualification of a judge and is to be sharply dis-
tinguished from change of venue which as to criminal cases is governed by
Rules 20 through 22 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It is a misuse of terms to say that the venue is changed when the
trial is had in the court where the suit was brought and some other than
the regular judge is called in to preside on the trial, in the very court
in which the record has all the while remained.'
DE FACTO JUDGE DISTINGUISHED
The actions of a de facto judge, so far as they affect third persons, are not
open to question.2
THE CommoN LAW RULE
At common law the major causes for disqualification of a judge were "sub-
stantial or direct interest in the event of the litigation, or close ties of blood or
affinity .... ,,M Similarly, a judge who had been of counsel was disqualified from
sitting. In the absence of these conditions,
the presumption of the rectitude of the judge in the discharge of his
duties in all other situations was indisputable; and hence the objection
to a judge for any other than the causes named was unknown to the
federal jurisprudence until the enactment of the Judicial Code.4
It has been stated that: "The common law of disqualification, unlike the
civil law, was clear and simple; a judge was disqualified for direct pecuniary
interest and for nothing else," 5 and further that: "No other disqualifications
were permitted, and bias, today the most controversial ground for disqualifica-
tion, was rejected entirely." 6
The Statute on Interest of Judge
Since 17927 there has been a statute permitting disqualification, upon ap-
plication by a party, on four separate grounds: (1) interest; (2) previous rep-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University; author of Criminal Procedure Under the
Federal Rules 6 vols. (1966-67).
1. Ex parte N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978, 998 (M.D. Ala. 1912).
2. Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891); McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S.
596, 601 (1895); Luhrig Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal & Dock Co., 287 F. 711, 713
(2d Cir. 1923).
3. Ex parte N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978, 986 (M.D. Ala. 1912).
4. Id. at 987-88.
5. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 605, 609 (1947).
6. Id. at 612.
7. 1 stat. 278 (1792).
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resentation of a party; (3) prospective participation in the case as a material
witness; and (4) relationship or connection with a party.
This statute was replaced in 1948 with the provision that:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel,
is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with
any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for
him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.8
While the former statute on disqualification for interest called for an ap-
plication by either party to the litigation, the present statute does not.0 The
clear intent of this change is that, in the proper case, the judge should disqualify
himself on his own initiative. Nevertheless, it has been held that there may
be a waiver by failing to object in the trial court.'0 Yet the Judicial Conference
has resisted contemporary proposals to place the matter in the hands of parties
or counsel."
Interest
The statute requiring any judge to disqualify himself in any case in which
he has a "substantial interest" normally contemplates pecuniary or beneficial
interest, 12 and does not apply in the absence of a showing or a specific charge
that the judge has such an interest.
Substantial beneficial interest has been held to exist where the judge was
a depositor in the bank from which the defendant allegedly embezzled funds 8
and also where the judge was a stockholder in a corporation being sued by the
United States government.' 4
Of Counsel
The United States Supreme Court has held that the fact that a judge has
formerly been of counsel for one of the parties in a different cause does not
prejudice his sitting in the case.' 5 Thus the disqualification is apparently limited
8. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948).
9. Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 1962).
10. Id. at 309.
11. Reports of the Proceedings of the judicial Conference of the United States,
Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
68-69 (1961).
12. United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 1965).
13. Ex parte Cornwell, 144 Ala. 497, 39 So. 354 (1905); Note, 6 Colum. L. Rev. 279
(1906).
14. In re Honolulu Consol. Oil. Co., 243 F. 348, 353 (9th Cir. 1917). See also Long
Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 189 F. Supp. 589, 610
(S.D. Cal. 1960).
15. The Richmond, 9 F. 863 (C.C.E.D. La. 1881). See also Spencer v. Lapsley, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 264, 266 (1858); Duncan v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 223 F. 446 (S.D. Ga.
1915). See also Carr v. Fife, 156 U.S. 494, 498 (1895), where the Supreme Court enunciated
a similar view.
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to those situations where the judge had been of counsel during a pending case.
Accordingly, the mere fact that a judge in a patent case formerly had a
client who is a party in the litigation does not disqualify the judge.16 Likewise,
the fact that the judge had represented relatives of the codefendant in certain
legal matters until shortly before becoming a judge does not show good cause
for recusation.17
However, where the judge has been of counsel during the pending case, he
should disqualify himself as did the judge who regarded himself as disqualified
by reason of official knowledge obtained during the time that he was an assistant
United States Attorney.18
If a judge fails to disqualify himself in such circumstances an appellate
court will often do it for him. Thus, a district judge who was United States At-
torney when the defendant was tried and convicted was held disqualified to act
on the defendant's motion to vacate judgment.19 This rationale has been extended
to a situation where the defendant pleaded guilty, and the United States Attorney
prior to his appointment as a judge merely signed the information and moved
for arraignment and sentence2 0
However, the rule is limited to situations where the facts and issues of the
pending case are identical to those in the previous case where the judge had
been of counsel. Thus, it has been held that a judge is not disqualified because
of his prior prosecution, while United States Attorney, of a defendant for an
offense involving the interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles2 ' since
different vehicles were involved in the second prosecution. If the same vehicles
had been involved in both cases there might be disqualification.
Also relevant is whether the judge in his "of counsel" capacity acquired
any knowledge of the case. For example, the court of appeals has held that the
fact that the judge had been United States Attorney while his office was prose-
cuting the case out of which the present perjury prosecution arose did not dis-
qualify him to preside over the perjury prosecution, where he had no prior con-
nection with the defendants, and defendant's counsel with full knowledge of
the facts raised no objection.22
Judge as Witness
In general, the presiding judge may not testify as a witness to a material
16. Durlington v. Studebaker Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 1959).
17. Simmons v. United States, 89 F.2d 591, 592 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
700 (1937).
18. United States v. Fricke, 261 F. 541, 543, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
19. United States v. Vasilick, 160 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1947).
20. United States v. Maher, 88 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Me. 1950).
21. Roberson v. United States, 249 F.2d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 919 (1958).
22. Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962). See also Cagson v. Hass
Purder, 253 F. Supp. 744, 748 (M.D. Fla. 1966).
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fact, and to do so constitutes prejudicial error.23 The rationale of this rule was
aptly stated in a concurring opinion in Lepper v. United States:2 4
Indeed, a judge presiding at a trial is not a competent witness, for
the duties of a judge and witness are incompatible. If he testified he
would have to pass upon the competency of his own testimony; and
as a witness he might be regarded as partisan, and would be subject to
embarrassing conflicts with counsel. The danger to the dignity of the
bench, of subjecting its impartiality to doubt and of placing the defen-
dant at an unfair advantage by admitting the presiding judge as a
witness is very obvious.25
The danger of prejudice to the defendant is also clear and has been stated
by the Supreme Court:
The result would be that the defendant must be deprived of ex-
amining or cross-examining him or else there would be the spectacle of
a trial judge presenting testimony upon which he must finally pass in
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
2 0
Thus, where, during the trial, the judge interrogates a witness, he should
be careful not to turn his interrogation into testimony. The court of appeals has
reversed a conviction, where the judge under the guise of asking questions of
the defendant as to an interview with the judge in net effect testified as to that
interview, in which the defendant had intimated his guilt.2 7
Disqualification of a judge on the ground that he was a material witness
is confined to situations where the party could have found an adequate sub-
stitute.28
It has been held that on a corare nobis proceeding some judge other than
the judge who presided at the time of plea and sentence should hear the case
and if the judge is a material witness he himself should not hear the case but
should disqualify himself.29
23. Lyon's Case, 15 F. Cas. 1183, 1184 (No. 8,646) (C.C.D. Vt. 1798); see Orfield,
Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules 684-686 (1966); See also 6 J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 1909 (3d ed. 1940). Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 872, 874 (No. 5,126)
(C.C.D. Pa. 1799). District Judge Peters testified. The other judge was Circuit Justice
Iredell. People v. McDermott, 180 Misc. 247, 40 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
citing 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1909, at 588 (3d ed. 1940). Cf. Downey v. United
States, 91 F.2d 223, 230, 234, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; Note, 11 S. Cal. L. Rev. 361 (1938). The
court of appeals considered the point although it was not raised and objected to at the
time.
24. Lepper v. United States, 233 F. 227 (4th Cir. 1916), quoted in Terrell v. United
States, 6 F.2d 498, 499 (4th Cir. 1925).
25. Id. at 230.
26. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955). The Court cited Hale v. Wyatt, 73
N.H. 214, 98 A. 379 (1916); Note, Witnesses-Competence-Competency of Presiding Judge
as Witness, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 115 (1914).
27. Terrell v. United States, 6 F.2d 498, 499 (4th Cir. 1925).
28. Borgia v. United States, 78 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
615 (1935).
29. United States v. Halley, 240 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1957). But see Dillon v. United
States, 307 F.2d 445, 453 (9th Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion).
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Relationship to Party
The danger of prejudice is apparent where thd presiding judge is related
to one of the parties in the law suit. In such circumstances the judge is obligated
to disqualify himself even where the parties have consented to his presiding. 0
Similarly where the judge is related to the attorneys involved he should also
disqualify himself. 31
Participation in such circumstances also involves ethical considerations for
in 1942 the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges adopted the following
resolution: "That it is the sense of the Conference that federal judges should
avoid sitting in cases in which their near relatives are of counsel, as contrary
to the spirit of canon 13 of the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion."32
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TME BIAS STATUTE
The present federal bias statute provides :33
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes
and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom
the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against
him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no fur-
ther therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceed-
ing.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief
that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days
before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard,
or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A
party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be ac-
companied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made
in good faith.
The debates in Congress in 1910 and 1911 showed "a surprising unanimity
in favor of this new remedy." 34 Congressman Mann of Illinois pointed out that
it had been successfully used in the western states for over thirty years, as well
as in foreign countries such as Germany, Spain and France.
When the proposed statute was before the House of Representatives,
Representative Cullop of Indiana, its sponsor, was asked whether it left to
the discretion of the district judge the determination of whether the affidavit
was sufficient to disqualify. His reply was:
Mr. Cullop: . . no it provides that the judge shall proceed no
further with the case. The filing of the affidavit deprives him of juris-
30. ln re Eatonton Elec. Co., 120 F. 1010 (S.D. Ga. 1903). There are no prior Federal
cases on the subject of consanguinity. See also Ex parte N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978,
986, 987 (M.D. Ala. 1912); In re Fox West Coast Theatres, 25 F. Supp. 250, 257-58 (S.D.
Cal. 1936), aff'd, 88 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 710 (1937).
31. State v. Deutsch, 34 NJ. 190, 199, 168 A.2d 12, 19 (1961).
32. The Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 28 A.B.AJ. 817, 820 (1942).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1948).
34. Putnam, Recusation, 9 Cornell L.Q. 1, 10 (1923).
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diction in the case. Mr. Cox: . . Suppose the affidavit sets out certain
reasons which may exist in the mind of the party making the affidavit;
suppose the judge to whom the affidavit is submitted says that it is
not a statutory reason? In other words, does it not leave it to the dis-
cretion of the judge? Mr. Cullop: No; it expressly provides that the
judge shall proceed no further. 35
The statute was modeled directly after similar Indiana statutes 0 which
have been construed as providing for automatic disqualification.8 7
In 1948 the words "at which the proceeding is to be heard" were added
to clarify the meaning of "before the beginning of the term."3 8
CONSTITUTIONALITY
It has been held that Congress cannot "lawfully enact that a judge, who
is in truth qualified, is in law disqualified because a suitor makes an affidavit
to that effect, and make that ex parte statement conclusive proof of the dis-
qualification and cut off all judicial inquiry as to the judge's competency."8 9
The disqualification of a judge to try a particular case must rest on the facts
which render him unfit. The existence of such facts must be determined as a
judicial question by some judicial tribunal. If the filing of the affidavit operated
to disqualify the judge from further acting in the litigation we would have a
situation where the
affidavit maker in fact, though not in name, puts on the judicial robes
and excludes the presiding judge and all other judicial authority from
any voice in determining the matter, and by the mere filing of an
affidavit renders judgment of disqualification and executes it.40
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE
There were several possible approaches to the interpretation of the statute.
The various state court interpretations are set forth in Ex Parte Fairbank Co.: 41
The decisions in states having statutes similar to the Judicial
Code are conflicting. The courts in some of the states hold that the
affidavit shuts off all judicial inquiry, and, even though the facts
alleged may be insufficient to show bias or prejudice, that the judge is
bound to grant the application. In other jurisdictions it is held that,
while the truth of the facts alleged cannot be contested, yet if the
facts alleged, taking them to be true, do not show personal bias or
prejudice, the application should be refused. Other cases hold that
35. 46 Cong. Rec. 2627 (1911). See also United States v. Flegenbeimer, 14 F. Supp.
584, 589 (D.NJ. 1935).
36. Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-1401, 9-1301 (1933).
37. See Note, 38 Ind. L.J. 289 (1963).
38. United States v. Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384, 388 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
39. lx parte Fairbanks Co., 194 F. 978, 996-97 (M.D. Ala. 1912). See Annot., 9
A.L.R. 1275 (1920).
40. Id. at 999.
41. Ex parte N.K. Fairbanks Co., 194 F. 978, (M.D. Ala. 1912). See Note, 21 Colum.
L. Rev. 387 (1921); Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1437 (1966).
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the truth of the affidavit is subject to contest, to be tried before the
judge in question, and upon the proof made before him the application
must be granted or overruled.4
Federal interpretation has also been split. One district court has stated that
"ever since the enactment of the Statute in 1912, the Courts have sought to
protect federal trial judges against the unilateralness of the procedure by
limiting its scope strictly, and construing it literally and narrowly."43
However, another district court has held that the statute "should be
interpreted liberally. . . .On the other hand, it cannot be used frivolously. "4"
Nevertheless, numerous later decisions in the lower federal courts have
adopted the narrow interpretation and the Supreme Court has consistently
declined to review them.45 The failure of Congress to change the law in 1948
in any material respect indicates legislative approval to such strict construction.
There are several safeguards against abuse of the statute. If the affidavit
is untruthful, the maker may be prosecuted for perjury and the attorney may
be disbarred. There must be a timely filing of the affidavit, and only one change
of judge is permitted. The affiant must state his reasons for the belief that
bias exists. He must allege personal bias. The affiant has the advantage of
delaying the trial, whether or not the judge is disqualified, and even if the
affidavit is insufficient, at the end of a losing trial the maker may appeal.
It has been stated that counsel of record "has an obligation which he
owes to the court as well as to his client, and he owes a public duty to aid the
administration of justice, to uphold the dignity of the court and respect its
authority. '46
AUTOmATIC DISQUALIFICATION
Automatic disqualification would doubtless result in abuses. In states
having only one district, a judge from another district would have to be called
in, and possibly litigants would maneuver not to be tried by certain judges. In
those states where automatic disqualification does exist, it has been widely
criticized. 47
USE OF ANOTHER JUDGE TO PASS ON DISQUAIFIcAION
One method of giving better protection to litigants is to submit the ques-
tion of bias to a second judge,48 and this has been done in a few cases.49 Also
42. Id. at 989.
43. Cole v. Loew's Inc., 76 F. Supp. 872, 875 (S.D. Cal. 1948). See also United States
v. Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 80, 83 (D.N.J. 1954); United States v. Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384,
388 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (citing numerous cases).
44. Allen v. Du Pont, 75 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D. Del. 1948); United States v. Gilboy,
162 F. Supp. 384, 389 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
45. Note, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 846, 847 (1949).
46. United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951).
47. Note, 38 Ind. L.J. 289 (1963).
48. Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias in the Federal District Court, 11 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 415, 429 (1950); Note, 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 349, 353 (1949).
49. Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 276 U.S. 627
(1927); Note, 13 Cornell L.Q. 454 (1928).
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some judges have referred an affidavit of prejudice to the executive committee
of the district for determination.50 Nevertheless, in the vast majority of cases
the judge himself passes on the sufficiency.51
RETROACTIVITY
Although it has been that the statute was not retroactive, 2 the Court
of Appeals in Henry v. Speer rejected this holding and held otherwise.5 3
APPELLATE COURTS
The statute on bias does not apply to appellate courts. 4 Accordingly
"whether a member of the Court of Appeals should disqualify himself because in
his opinion he is so related or connected with any party or his attorney as to
render it improper for him to sit in the appeal is a matter confided to the con-
science of the particular judge." 55
Thus, a judge of the court of appeals who presided at the first trial of the
criminal defendant, which conviction was thereafter reversed, may sit on the
appeal from the second conviction. 6
Similarly, where on a criminal appeal the bench of three judges reversed
the conviction by a vote of two to one and the case then came on for rehearing
before the Court of Appeals sitting en banc, one judge of the three who sat
originally may sit again even though the two who voted for reversal were
absent, and the rehearing resulted in affirmance of the conviction. 7
Mr. Justice Jackson has stated in a concurring opinion:
No statute prescribes ground upon which a Justice of this Court
may be disqualified in any case. The Court has never undertaken by
rule of Court or decision to formulate any uniform practice on the
subject. Because of this lack of authoritative standards it appears
always to have been considered the responsibility of each Justice to
determine for himself the propriety, of withdrawing in any particular
circumstances.. . .There is no authority known to me under which
a majority of this Court has power under any circumstances to exclude
one of its duly commissioned Justices from sitting or voting in any
case.
58
50. United States v. Irving, 241 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 353 U.S. 983 (1957).
51. United States v. Buck, 18 F. Supp. 827, 829 (WI). Mo. 1937).
52. Henry v. Harris, 191 F. 868, 874 (S.D. Ga. 1912). See also Ex parte N.K. Fairbank
Co., 194 F. 978, 985 (M.D. Ala. 1912); Ex parte Glasgow, 195 F. 780, 782 (N.D. Ga. 1912).
53. Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869, 871 (5th Cir. 1913). The statute is set forth in
id.
54. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 213 F. 449 (1st Cir. 1914); Millslagle v.
Olson, 128 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1942); Ginger v. Cohn, 255 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1958);
MacNeil Bros. Co. v. Cohen, 264 F.2d 186, 189 (1st Cir. 1959); Sanders v. Piggly Wiggly
Corp., 1 F.2d 582, 584 (W!). Tenn. 1924).
55. MacNeil Bros. Co. v. Cohen, 264 F.2d 186, 189 (1st Cir. 1959), citing, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 47, 455 (1958).
56. United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789, 806 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
678 (1942).
57. Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (Sth Cir. 1964).
58. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am., 325
U.S. 897 (1945).
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It should be noted, however, that the Justices of the Supreme Court have
been quite liberal in disqualifying themselves. As one court has stated:
we notice that the several attorneys general, having charge of over
twenty thousand cases annually filed in the eighty-four district courts,
in which the United States is a party and of most of which they could
have no knowledge of the facts involved, upon becoming members
of the Supreme Court has disqualified themselves in all Supreme
Court proceedings affecting any such litigation.59
The only statutory limitation on an appellate judge is that if he presided
at the trial of a particular case he cannot hear or determine the appeal of
that case.60
REFEREE IN BANKIUPTCY
The statute on disqualification of a judge does not apply to a referee in
bankruptcy.61
TERRITORIAL SCOPE
The disqualification statute originally applied only to the District Courts
of the United States.62 It did not apply to Alaska, the Virgin Islands, the
Canal Zone and Guam.6 3 Upon the revision of the Judicial Code in 1949 it was
made to apply to Hawaii and Puerto Rico, but not Alaska.
WHO MAY MoVE To DisQu~Airy
The motion to disqualify can be made only by a party to the litigation.6"
It is not enough that it is made by his attorney in fact.65 The consent of the
court is not required for the filing of the affidavit. 66
THE AFFIDAviT
The filing of the affidavit is essential, and the case will not be reversed
on appeal in the absence of such filing.67
Where a federal criminal defendant wishes to disqualify the judge he should
proceed as provided in the statute, or he will not be permitted to introduce
evidence of an otherwise collateral matter for the purpose of discrediting the
59. Connelly v. United States Dist. Ct., 191 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1951).
60. 28 U.S.C. (1948).
61. Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 200 (10th Cir. 1940); Ginger v. Cohn, 255 F.2d 99
(6th Cir. 1958).
62. Tjosevig v. United States, 255 F. 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1919).
63. Callwood v. Cailwood, 127 F. Supp. 179, 180 (D. V. L 1954).
64. Anchor Grain Co. v. Smith, 297 F. 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1924); De Ran v. Killits,
8 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1925); In re Milwaukee & Sawyer Bldg. Corp., 79 F.2d 478 (7th Cir.
1935).
65. Cuddy v. Otis, 33 F.2d 577, 578 (8th Cir. 1929).
66. Walker v. United States, 113 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir. 1940).
67. Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 946 (1962); United States v. Inches, 253 F. Supp. 312 (D. Ariz. 1966).
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judge and attempting to show his animus.68 Any references to judicial bias in
the brief will be stricken by the court of appeals.
The affidavit must be strictly construed and must conform to the statute.60
It was originally held that the affidavit should not be merely on information
and belief as to the personal bias of the judge,70 but in 1921 the Supreme
Court ruled that the facts may be alleged on the affiant's information and
belief.71 Further, "it was not within the province of the trial judge to pass upon
the good faith of the defendant, the affidavit being sufficient in form and ac-
companied by the required certificate of counsel as to good faith." 72
An affidavit of prejudice must be sworn to or affirmed,78 and a party
may not file more than one affidavit in the case.
An affidavit obviously malicious and scandalous toward the judge may
constitute contempt of court.74 Similarly, an attorney who certifies to the good
faith of an affidavit made by his client charging impeachable offenses against
the judge may be prosecuted for contempt. 75 Also, filing a belated affidavit
against a judge before whom matters in litigation are pending undecided may
be contempt of court as constituting an improper effort to influence a judicial
decision.76
The criminal defendant's affidavit of prejudice against the judge does not
divest the court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter or person of the de-
fendant, but merely affects the power of the judge against whom the affidavit
is directed to proceed. 77
AFIDAVITS FILED BY THE GOVERNMENT
Where affidavits of prejudice are filed by the Government, the persons
68. Wierse v. United States, 252 F. 435, 442 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 568
(1918). See also Keown v. Hughes, 265 F. 572, 577 (1st Cir. 1920).
69. Henry v. Harris, 191 F. 868, 872 (S.D. Ga. 1912), rev'd on other grounds, 201
F. 872 (5th Cir. 1913). See also Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1913) ; Kceown v.
Hughes, 265 F. 572, 576 (1st Cir. 1920); Beland v. United States, 117 F.2d 958, 960
(5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 585 (1941); Scott v. Beams, 122 F.2d 777, 787-88
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 809 (1941); United States v. 16,000 Acres of Land, 49
F. Supp. 645, 648 (D. Kansas 1942).
70. Ex parte N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978, 985, 992 (M.D. Ala. 1912).
71. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). See also Korer v. Hoffman, 212
F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1954).
72. Morris v. United States, 26 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1928). See also Simmons v.
United States, 302 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1962). But see Johnson v. United States, 35 F.2d
355, 357 (W.D. Wash. 1929).
73. In re Beecher, 50 F. Supp. 530, 531 (E.D. Wash. 1943); United States v. Inches,
253 F. Supp. 312 (D. Ariz. 1966). See United States v. Buck, 23 F. Supp. 508, 509 (W.D.
Mo. 1938), appeal dismissed, 102 F.2d 976 (8th Cir. 1938). See also Martin v. Texas Indem.
Ins. Co., 214 F. Supp. 477, 480 (N.D. Tex.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 971 (1962).
74. Fleming v. United States, 279 F. 613 (9th Cir. 1922).
75. Laughlin v. United States, 151 F.2d 281, 284 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
777 (1945).
76. American Brake Shoe & F. Co. v. Interborough R.T. Co., 6 F. Supp. 215, 219
(S.D.N.Y. 1933).
77. Carroll v. Zerbst, 76 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1935).
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filing must have authority to do so. Special attorneys for the Department of
Justice must evidence their authority to so act.7 8
In 1954 there was decided one of the first federal criminal cases in which
the affidavit of prejudice was made by the government.7 9 The judge declined
to disqualify himself, striking the affidavit as scandalous. Prior to the affidavit
the judge had stricken the most important counts in the indictment against the
defendant as too vague, and the court of appeals had sustained him in large
part.
Tm oF FILING AFFIDAviT
Under the statute the affidavit of disqualification should be filed ten days
before term, unless good cause is shown to do otherwise. Tendering it on the
eve of a second trial, six weeks after mandate of the appellate court went down,
was held to be too late.80 The only excuse was that the mandate was not filed
in the trial court until after the term began. Where an affidavit was not filed
ten days before the beginning of the term, and good cause for the delay was
not shown, and it was filed for the purpose of delay, containing assertions
which were untrue, irrelevant, or scandalous, there was no disqualification.8 1
It is too late to file the affidavit at the conclusion of the trial.8 2
Although it may be better practice to permit a late filing of an affidavit
of prejudice then to strike it, refusing to permit it to be filed is not prejudicial
error.
83
Where the indictment is found less than ten days before commencement
of term, the affidavit must be filed as soon as practicable before the term begins,
or where the indictment is found after the term has begun, as soon as dis-
qualifying facts are known, unless good cause is shown for delay.8 In the
absence of a statute, the challenge must be made at the first opportunity after
discovery of facts tending to prove disqualification. There have been a number
of cases in which the rule has not been strictly adhered to due to mitigating
78. United States v. 16,000 Acres of Land, 49 F. Supp. 645, 651 (D. Kan. 1942).
79. United States v. Lattimore, 125 F. Supp. 295 (D.D.C. 1954). See also United States
ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 178 F. Supp. 44 (D. Conn. 1958) (A state warden attacked the
qualifications of the judge in a proceeding involving a state prisoner.); United States v.
Ritter, CJ., 273 F.2d 30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 946 (1959) (dvil case).
As to an earlier federal criminal case see Rosenwald, Affidavits of Bias and Prejudice
Disqualifying Federal Judges, 20 St. Louis L. Rev. 321, 329 (1935). See also Ratner, Dis-
qualification of Judges for Prior Judicial Actions, 3 How. L.J. 228, 248-249 (1957).
80. Shea v. United States, 251 F. 433, 434-35 (6th Cir. 1918). See also Ex parte
Glasgow, 195 F. 780, 782 (N.M. Ga. 1912); Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797, 804
(8th Cir.) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958).
81. Anderson Coal Co. v. Waban Rose Conservatories, 278 F. 945 (D. Mass. 1921).(The affidavit was ordered to be stricken from the record.).
82. Walker v. United States, 113 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir. 1940).
83. Shea v. United States, 251 F. 433, 435 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 581 (1918).
84. Chafin v. United States, 5 F.2d 592, 594 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 552
(1925). See also Bishop v. United States, 16 F.2d 410, 411 (8th Cir. 1926), modified, 19
F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1927); Rossi v. United States, 16 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1926); Wyant
v. Brennan, 85 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1936); Scott v. Beams, 122 F.2d 777, 788 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 315 U.S. 809 (1941).
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circumstances such as where the defendant's counsel had refused to follow the
defendant's request to file an affidavit85 or where the presiding judge had only
been assigned four days before trial.8 6
But affidavits have been held to be untimely where the excuse for late
filing was the death of one of three of the defendant's attorneys,8 7 or where
an uncounselled defendant who had had considerable experience in criminal
courts had not filed his affidavit in a timely fashion.88
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
An affidavit without certificate of counsel of record is ineffectual to dis-
qualify the judge.8 9 A court has stated: "The certificate of counsel that the
affidavit and application are made in good faith is indispensable as a precaution
against abuse, and strict and full compliance with the provisions of the statute
is required."90
The phrase "counsel of record" has been held to mean an "attorney at
law admitted to the bar of the court who has been counsel of record in the
case." 9' Thus, affidavits certified to have been made in good faith by nonresident
counsel who had never been admitted as attorneys of the court, were not
certified by counsel of record as required by the statute.92
The certificate should be by individual counsel and not by a partnership.03
A district court has ruled that the certificate of counsel must be as to
counsel's own good faith and not the good faith of the criminal defendant.04
Another district court has stated: "While the belief is that of the defendant,
85. Morris v. United States, 26 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1928).
86. Lipscomb v. United States, 33 F.2d 33, 34 (8th Cir. 1929). See also Tennessee
Publ. Co. v. Carpenter, 100 F.2d 728, 734 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 659 (1934);
United States v. Buck, 23 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Mo.), appeal dismissed, 102 F.2d 976 (8th
Cir. 1938); Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 283 U.S.
863 (1931). Bommarito v. United States, 61 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1932). Bowles v. United
States, 50 F.2d 848, 850 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 648 (1931). Bennett v. United
States, 158 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 822 (1947).
87. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1948). Judge Prettyman
dissented, pointing out that due diligence was the test in the District of Columbia. Id. at 283.
88. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (1949), (5-4 decision); Hibdon v. United
States, 213 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1954); United States v. Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384, 389 (M.D.
Pa.), aff'd, Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958).
89. Alaska Bar Ass'n v. Dickerson, 240 F. Supp. 732, 735 (D. Alas. 1965).
90. Cuddy v. Otis, 33 F.2d 577, 578 (8th Cir. 1929). See also Newman v. Zerbst,
83 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1936).
91. Currin v. Nourse, 74 F.2d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 729
(1935). See also United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
869 (1951); United States v. Garden Homes, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 415, 418 (D.N.H. 1953).
92. Ex parte N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978, 985 (M.D. Ala. 1912). See also Saunders
v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 1 F.2d 582, 587-88 (W.D. Tenn. 1924); Morse v. Lewis, 54 F.2d
1027, 1031 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 557 (1932); Currin v. Nourse, 74 F.2d 273,
275 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 729 (1935); United States v. Gilboy, 162 F.
Supp. 384, 391 (MD. Pa. 1958); Freed v. Inland Empire Ins. Co., 174 F. Supp. 458, 464
(D. Utah 1959).
93. Benedict v. Seiberling, 17 F.2d 831, 838 (Ni.D. Ohio 1926).
94. United States v. Flegenheimer, 14 F. Supp. 584, 592 (D.N.J. 1935), appeal dis-
missed, 110 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1936) (Appellant died.). See also United States v. Parker, 23
F. Supp. 880, 886 (D.NJ. 1938).
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the good faith certified to as to the affidavit and certificate includes that
of counsel."95
In another case it was stated:
A certificate of good faith must mean, at the least, that counsel
has some belief that the motion is arguably proper. The certificate is
a continuing representation. . . .At an appropriate time I will con-
sider what, if any, disciplinary action is necessary. Cf. Rule 11,
Fed. Rules Civil Proc.96
As long as the criminal defendant "honestly believed that the judge was
biased and stated on what facts he based his opinion, it was his right to call on
his counsel to give the certificate provided by the statute in order to have the
question of bias determined."97
Where the criminal defendant had counsel of record at all times and
counsel declined to sign the certificate of bias, the defendant is not entitled
to file such an affidavit on the ground that he was representing himself in the
matter.98 While the question has not been definitively answered, where the
applicant for disqualification is without counsel the omission of the certificate
of counsel "probably is not fatal."99
Where a criminal defendant is represented by counsel of record, he cannot
evade the requirement of a certificate of counsel even though such counsel
is unwilling to give the certificate.10 0 Where the defendant has several counsel
during the proceeding and the first counsel has not withdrawn his appearance,
the certificate should be made by such first counsel.
An attorney who certifies to the good faith of an affidavit made by his
client charging impeachable offenses against the judge may be prosecuted for
contempt. 101
PERSONAL BiAs
The affidavit must specifically allege personal prejudice and bias toward the
party seeking disqualification. 10 2 As the Supreme Court has stated: "The basis
of the disqualification is that 'personal bias or prejudice' exists, by reason of
which the judge is unable to impartially exercise his functions in the particular
95. United States v. Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384, 392 (M.D. Pa. 1958). See also Freed
v. Inland Empire Ins. Co., 174 F. Supp. 458, 465 (D. Utah 1959); Cf. In re Union Leader
Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 385 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
96. Denis v. Perfect Parts, 142 F. Supp. 263, 264 (D. Mass. 1956).
97. Flegenheimer v. United States, 110 F.2d 379, 381 (3d Cir. 1936). But see In re
Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 385 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
98. Beland v. United States, 117 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 585(1941).
99. It re Beecher, 50 F. Supp. 530, 531 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
100. Mitchell v. United States, 126 F.2d 550, 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
702 (1942).
101. Laughlin v. United States, 151 F.2d 281, 284 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
777 (1945).
102. Henry v. Harris, 191 F. 868, 872 (S.D. Ga.), rev'd on other grounds, 201 F. 872(5th Cir. 1913). See also Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869, 871 (5th Cir. 1913).
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case."103 It is not sufficient to allege an "impersonal prejudice." 0 4 Thus it has
been held insufficient to allege merely that the judge was a director or trustee of
the bank which had been robbed by the defendant.
In the leading decision of Berger v. United States,10 the Supreme Court
decided the question of whether a trial judge who had expressed strong anti-
German emotions was qualified to try Germans for espionage after the First
World War. The Court held the judge disqualified. Mr. Justice Reynolds
asserted in dissent: "A public officer who entertained no aversion towards dis-
loyal German immigrants during the late war was simply unfit for his place.
... Neither is an amorphous dummy unspotted by human emotions a becoming
receptacle for judicial power."' 06 Professor Kenneth C. Davis after referring
to this case asks, "Who is best qualified to try a Communist for advocating
overthrow of the government by force-a Communist, an anti-Communist, or
one who is on the fence between Communism and democracy?" 07
In the Berger case the Court held that the mere filing of a sufficient affida-
vit will compel a trial judge to disqualify himself, and the judge may not pass
upon the truth or falsity of the charges made in the affidavit. Upon the filing
of an affidavit in conformity with the statute averring the affiant's belief that
the judge before whom the case is to be tried has a personal bias or prejudice
against him, and stating facts and reasons, substantial in character and which,
if true, fairly establish a mental attitude of the judge against the affiant which
may prevent impartiality of judgment, it becomes the duty of the judge to
retire from the case.'08 There is little for a defendant to gain in having his
case tried by one judge rather than another, and the penalty for perjury is so
severe that this rule will work no mischief. A later case thus interpreted the
decision: "Their statements were made against a class of which the defendant
was a member. They evinced pronounced personal prejudice against that class
showing a personal prejudice against the defendant."')09
In Eisler v. United States,"0 the court of appeals held that an affidavit
reflecting on the background of the trial judge as a special assistant to the
Attorney General, alleging that the judge, in that capacity, directly assisted
103. Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 43 (1913). See also Saunders v.
Piggly Wiggly Corp., 1 F.2d 582, 584 (W.D. Tenn. 1924); Ryan v. United States, 99 F.2d
864, 871 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 635 (1938).
104. Price v. Johnston 125 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 677 (1942).
105. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) (6-3) ; Note, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 387
(1921).
106. Id. at 43.
107. K.C. Davis, Cases on Administrative Law 447 (1951).
108. This case was folIwed in Nations v. United States, 14 F.2d 507, 509 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 735 (1926). See also United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 878 (6th Cir.
1965); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1966).
109. Ryan v. United States, 99 F.2d 864, 871 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 635
(1939).
110. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (Prettyman, J.,
dissenting). For a criticism of this case see Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias in the
Federal District Courts, 11 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 415, 421-23 (1950).
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FBI inquiries into the activities of aliens and Communists, including the
affiant, alleging that the judge was a close friend of the director of the FBI,
and that the judge had, in connection with other duties, sponsored legislation
providing for the deportation of other Communists, did not allege personal
bias; hence the affidavit was properly stricken. The defendant was an alien
Communist. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but when the defendant
became a fugitive, the Court left the case off the docket,"' and then dismissed
the petition for certiorari. 12
In Foster v. Medina, s3 the affidavit alleged that on a motion for a continu-
ance of ninety days to brief the constitutionality of an anti-Communist statute
the judge stated that public policy required that the matter not be held off
indefinitely when perhaps there might be "some more of these fellows up to
that sort of thing," that he was not going to give anything like ninety days,
and, that in answer to the argument that the indictment alleged no acts of force
or violence, he asserted, "No, they want to wait until they get everything set
and then the acts will come," was not sufficient. A writ of mandamus was re-
fused.
In United States v. Fujimoto," 4 an affidavit did not show personal bias in
a Smith Act prosecution where it alleged that the defendant had made prior
written attacks on the judge in a newspaper, a prior correct statement by the
judge as to the Smith Act, or prior objection by the judge to a speaker at a
dedication ceremony on the ground of the speaker's identification with a Com-
munist front organization.
Since the litigant must show personal bias the statute "applies only to a
comparatively rare situation and is relatively ineffective in some cases where
there is an appearance of partiality."" 5
ALLEGING THE FACTS
Most states have statutes providing for disqualification of judges for
prejudice, and the majority require that the affidavit set forth the facts showing
disqualification." 6
Their statutes are not applicable "save in those rare histances in which the
affiant is able to state facts which tend to show not merely adverse rulings al-
ready made which may be right or wrong, but facts and reasons which tend to
show personal bias or prejudice."" 7 More specifically the statutes require
111. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (1949) (5-4).
112. 338 U.S. 883 (1949).
113. Foster v. Medina, 170 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 909 (1948);
Note, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 846 (1949).
114. United States v. Fujimoto, 101 F. Supp. 293 (D. Hawaii 1951).
115. Note, 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 349, 353 (1949).
116. Note, 16 Colum. L. Rev. 163, (1916).
117. Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35 43-44 (1913). See also Keown v.
Hughes, 265 F. 572, 577 (1st Cir. 1920); Minnesota & Ont. Paper Co. v. Molyneux, 70
F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 1934); Newman v. Zerbst, 83 F.2d 973, 974 (10th Cir. 1936); Cf.
Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir. 1950); United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868,
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not merely the conclusion of the affiant drawn from the facts, but a
statement of the facts themselves, and these should be set out with at
least that particularity one would expect to find in a bill of particulars
filed by a pleader in an action at law to supplement and explain the
general statements of a formal pleading." 8
The Supreme Court has stated: "Of course, the reasons and facts for the
belief the litigant entertains are an essential part of the affidavit, and must
give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede
impartiality of judgment."11
Judge Pickett has stated: "To warrant disqualification of a judge, the
affidavit must contain more than mere conclusions on the part of the pleader ." 20
For example, an dllegation in an affidavit of bias that the judge had told the
grand jury that evidence existed which, if produced and believed, would show
a conspiracy and concealment by the defendant and that the judge then knew
of no evidence, constituted an allegation of fact which the judge would be
required to accept as true, even if false, so as to disqualify himself.121
OPINION OF PSYCHIATRIST
The opinion of a psychiatrist that the facts of the case show subconscious
bias has not been accepted as a basis for recusation of the judge.' 22 However,
it has been suggested that it be made a basis:
Therefore, when the judge is presented with the opinion of a psy-
chiatrist that the facts alleged give rise to an inference of prejudice,
he should recuse himself, or if he is not yet willing to do so, he should
be required to seek further psychiatric evidence from other experts.
If this evidence substantiates that presented by the movant, withdrawal
of the judge should be mandatory.123
TRIAL OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Rulings by the current judge against the defendant in prior trials of like
character do not show personal bias,' 24 even if the prior suit involved a differ-
878 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Fricke, 261 F. 541, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); United
States, v. Fujimoto, 101 F. Supp. 293, 297 (D. Hawaii 1951).
118. Morse v. Lewis, 54 F.2d 1027, 1032 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 557 (1932).
See also Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 863
(1931).
119. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
120. Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 202 F.2d 169, 171 (10th Cir. 1953).
121. United States v. Pendergast, 34 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
122. Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958).
123. Forer, Psychiatric Evidence in the Recusation ol Judges, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1325,
1331 (1960).
124. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Tatham, 40 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1930);
Barnes v. United States, 241 F.2d 252, 254 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Martin v. United States, 285
F.2d 150 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961); United States v. Valenti, 120 F.
Supp. 80, 85 (D.N.J. 1954); But see Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1451 (1966). See
Wilkes v. United States, 80 F.2d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1935), where an affidavit of prejudice
against defendants prosecuted for using the mails to defraud based upon adverse rulings
of the judge in a civil action against the defendants, refusal to postpone the trial, communi-
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ent complainant seeking the same relief. 5 The affiant's failure to obtain favor-
able judgments in similar actions brought before the judge similarly does not
show personal bias.12 0
Thus in United States v. Buck,1 27 a judge's statement, in opinions on mo-
tions for new trial in prosecutions for conspiracies against the civil rights of
voters in Kansas City, Missouri, that "sinister forces are at work in Kansas
City," and that "sinister forces weye and are lurking in the background" did
not disqualify the judge from trying similar actions where the statements were
relevant to matters under discussion in the opinions and were fully justified.
Similarly, a judge presiding at the Mann Act trial of a panderer is not
disqualified because he had previously presided at the trial at which the prosti-
tute was convicted, and had thereafter read the presentence report on the
prostitute, whose credibility was an important issue in the trial of the pan-
derer.128 Affidavits stating that the judges of the Central Division of the
Southern District of California had adjudicated the bankruptcies out of which
the criminal defendant arose and that the principal government witnesses in
the instant case were bankrupts adjudicated by these judges are insufficient to
show personal bias.' 29 The fact the judge assigned a civil action, which was
related to the bank robbery prosecution to another judge because his participa-
tion in the bank robbery trial made it inadvisable for him to try the civil
action, was not a basis for disqualifying himself to hear further motions in
the bank robbery prosecution. 30
DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE SAME PROCEEDING
One Justice of the Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion, held it im-
proper for a trial judge to confer with an FBI agent regarding the defendant's
background before any plea is entered.13 - The Justice argued for a reversal
under the supervisory power,. rather than as a matter of due process. However,
cation of prejudice of another judge to the presiding judge, statements of third parties not
made to the defendants or to the judge, and belief that the judge had been informed that
the defendants had used political influence to impede the prosecution, did not sufficiently
support a charge of bias of the judge.
125. Morse v. Lewis, 54 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 557 (1932);
See Ratner, Disqualification of Judges for Prior Judicial Actions, 3 How. L.. 228,
238-45 (1957).
126. Curtis v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 206 (D.NJ. 1950).
127. United States v. Buck, 18 F. Supp. 827, 830 (W.D. Mo. 1937). See also United
States v. Murphy, 19 F. Supp. 987 (WI). Mo. 1937); See also Ryan v. United States,
99 F.2d 864, 871 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 635 (1939); Ferrari v. United States,
169 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1948); Brown v. Buchkoe, 244 F.2d 865, 866 (6th Cir. 1957);
Moore v. Buchkoe, 175 F. Supp. 780 (WI). Mich. 1958).
128. United States v. Chrisos, 291 F.2d 535, 537 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829
(1961).
129. Lyons v. United States, 325 F.2d 370, 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 969
(1963). See also United States v. Inches, 253 F. Supp. 312 (D. Ariz. 1966).
130. United States v. Lawrenson, 334 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1964).
131. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 11, 17-18 (1959). See Ratner, supra note
125, at 246-52.
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this opinion has not been followed and in general will not result in reversal on
grounds of bias.
It has been held that an allegation that the judge had had a conference
with the United States Attorney regarding the case without the presence of
the defendant's attorney does not show bias.13 2 A limited discussion by the
judge with counsel for the defendants in a civil case, who had represented the
judge in a mandamus and prohibition proceeding to review his ruling in such
case, was held by the trial court not disqualify the judge from acting in the
case,1 33 but the court of appeals disagreed. 34
A judge is not disqualified to try a case because in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding he had ordered an investigation with a view to prosecution.131
No bias was held shown in an affidavit charging (1) that a portion of the
judge's charge to the grand jury indicated that he had some general knowledge
that the subject of jury tampering would be investigated by the grand jury;
(2) that the judge conducted a hearing in which the defendant was ordered to
answer nonincriminating questions of the grand jury prior to his indictment;
(3) that the judge heard evidence on pretrial motions in this case and three
related cases, and in disbarment proceedings in two other related matters;
(4) and that the judge had recused himself from two related cases.' 30
Critical remarks by the judge at pretrial conference to the party's lawyer
do not show bias.' 37 The bias must be directed to the party and not to his
attorney.
A court of appeals reversed a conviction where the judge who presided in
a non-jury trial had previously acquired allegedly incriminating evidence
against one of three defendants. The judge had stated: "I think I have one
of your men convicted right here."'311
A judge will not be disqualified where he has judicially formed an opinion
as to the law of the case and the rights of the parties and has published it for
legitimate purposes. 3 9 An affidavit based only on the judge's comments on
questions of law affecting the sufficiency of the indictment and a continuance,
based on the assumption that the allegations in the indictment were true, does
not show bias. 40 It was held in a federal criminal case that a mere refusal to
132. Willenbring v. United States, 306 F.2d 944, 946 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Scott v. Beams,
122 F.2d 777, 788 (10th Cir. 1941).
133. Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 645 (ElD. Pa. 1964).
134. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1965); Note, 17 S.C.L. Rev. 785
(1965); Note, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1310 (1965).
135. Epstein v. United States, 196 F. 354 (7th Cir. 1912). See Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d
1318 (1950).
136. United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 1965).
137. Sanders v. Allen, 58 F. Supp. 417, 419 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
138. McFadden v. United States, 63 F.2d 111, 112 (7th Cir. 1933). See Note, 51 Yale
L.J. 169, 172-73 (1941).
139. Henry v. Harris, 191 F. 868, 872 (S.D. Ga. 1912), rev'd on other grounds, 201
F. 812 (5th Cir. 1913). See also Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 1 F.2d 582, 585 (W.D.
Tenn. 1924); Parker v. New England Oil Corporation, 13 F.2d 497 (D. Mass. 1926).
140. United States v. Foster, 81 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), mandamus denied, 170 F.2d
632 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 909 (1949).
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grant the defendant's counsel a long extension of time to plead as requested
does not show bias or prejudice of the judge. 141 Nor does mere denial of a
continuance show bias or prejudice.142
The fact that a judge grants a severance to a criminal defendant does not
disqualify him from presiding over the subsequent trial of the severed de-
fendant.148
Conviction of a judge of the defendant's guilt based on evidence at a
former trial which terminated in a mistrial is not personal prejudice under
the federal statute. Otherwise "no judge could be qualified to sit at two trials
of the same case.' 44 Before the second trial the defendant alleged in his
affidavit that when the jury disagreed the judge sent them out telling them
that if they were honest men they should go out and bring in a verdict, indi-
cating by his manner a desire for conviction, and kept the jury out all night;
that during the trial the judge, while telling the jury that they could not infer
guilt from the defendant's failure to testify, by his manner showed that he
thought otherwise; and that the judge was prejudiced against liquor law vio-
lators as shown by excessive fines and jail sentences.
The Supreme Court has stated, per Justice Frankfurter: "Certainly it
is not the rule of judicial administration that, statutory requirements apart,
see Judicial Code sec. 21, 28 U.S.C. sec. 25, a judge is disqualified from sitting
in a retrial because he was reversed in earlier rulings.' 45
It is clear that the federal judge who tried the case can, after reversal on
appeal, retry the case. The mere fact that the judge at the first trial made
remarks critical of the conduct of certain witnesses for the defense does not
disqualify him.1 46 Even though the law of the state in which the federal court
sits precludes the same judge from sitting on retrial, such law does not apply
to a federal judge. 147
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has held that the fact that the trial
judge had already heard the evidence and had formed an opinion of the guilt
of the defendant during the first trial was not a ground for disqualification on
retrial.148 Moreover, the trial judge could not be required by the defendant
to testify whether he had formed or expressed an opinion of guilt or innocence.
Another court held that where the trial judge concurs in the verdict of the
jury without any expression of opinion as to guilt, he is not disqualified to
141. United States v. Fricke, 261 F. 541, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
142. Caddy v. Otis, 33 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1929) ; Wilkes v. United States, 80 F.2d 285,
289 (9th Cir. 1935); Refior v. Lansing Drop Forge Co., 124 F.2d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 1942).
143. United States v. Holt, 333 F.2d 455, 457 (2d Cir. 1964).
144. Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 608 (1st Cir. 1927); Note, 13 Corn. L.Q.
454 (1928). See also Ratner, supra note 141, at 229-38.
145. NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219 (1947).
146. Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 202 F.2d 169, 171 (10th Cir. 1953). See
also Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 946
(1962); United States v. Mallnsky, 153 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
147. United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 178 F. Supp. 44, 45 (D. Conn. 1958).
148. State v. Angel, 141 La. 921, 75 So. 843 (1917).
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preside at a second trial. But where he has expressed a decided opinion of
guilt in passing sentence he should not preside at the second trial over objec-
tion.149 However, a different state court held that the trial judge's statements
at a former trial, expressing belief in the defendant's guilt and lecturing him,
did not disqualify the judge.150 In Connecticut and Indiana, statutes provide
for retrial before another judge after reversal on appeal.151 This appears to be
a sound solution. Reliance merely on the discretion of the trial judge does not
appear adequate.
The statute does not apply when the criminal defendant pleads guilty and
then files an affidavit of prejudice in order to secure sentencing by another
judge.152 Moreover, the affidavit is not timely.
Where, after sentencing, the defendant moves for reconsideration and re-
duction of the sentence, and to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere, the
sentencing judge may hear the motions, particularly where no objection was
raised prior to, or at, the hearing thereon. 5 3
A trial judge was held not disqualified because he had read a presentence
report containing information prejudicial to the defendant before the case
was actually tried; the defendant originally pleaded guilty, and thereafter the
presentence report was prepared and presented to the judge. On the day set
for sentencing the defendant withdrew his guilty plea, and subsequently the
case came up for trial, and no request for disqualification was made.'"4
In a habeas corpus proceeding a judge is not disqualified because he had
ruled against the prisoner in a series of former writs, if the only question before
the court was one of law, and leave to appeal in forma pauperis was granted.'
The fact that the trial judge had previously heard and disposed of a
habeas corpus proceeding in connection with the sentence imposed on a prior
trial for the same offense did not disqualify the judge in a case in which he
had granted a writ of habeas corpus. 156
The judge by whom sentence in a criminal case was imposed is not bound
to disqualify himself upon the hearing of a motion to vacate and correct the
sentence, where there is no charge of prejudice and no dispute as to any material
fact.157
149. State v. Atterbery, 134 S.C. 392, 133 S.E. 101 (1926).
150. Kolowich v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 264 Mich. 668, 250 N.W. 875 (1933).
(Earlier cases are collected.)
151. Ratner, supra note 141, at 236-37.
152. United States v. Costea, 52 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Mich. 1943).
153. Kramer v. United States, 166 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1948). See also Taylor v.
United States, 179 F.2d 640, 642 (9th Cir. 1950).
154. United States v. Kravitz, 303 F.2d 700 (3d Cir.), cert. dended, 371 U.S. 922
(1962).
155. Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 644 (9th Cir. 1950).
156. United States v. Lowrey, 77 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Pa. 1948), aff'd, 172 F.2d 226
(3d Cir. 1949). See also Martin v. United States, 285 F.2d 150 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 853 (1960). See ABA Report on Post-Conviction Remedies 28-31 (1967).
157. Oxman v. United States, 148 F.2d 750 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945); but see United States v. Miller, 321 U.S. 752 (1944).
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One court has stated: 15 8
Complaint is made that the judge who tried the case passed upon
the motion. Not only was there no impropriety in this, but it is highly
desirable in such cases that the motions be passed on by the judge
who is familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the
trial, and is consequently not likely to be mislead. It was to avoid the
unseemly practice of having attacks upon the regularity of trials
made before another judge through resort to habeas corpus that section
2255 of title 28 was inserted in the Judicial Code.
An affidavit for disqualification of the judge on a motion to vacate pro-
ceeding is not sufficient when it alleges merely adverse rulings made by the
court and subjective conclusions as to the motives of the court and its manner
in conducting the trial and subsequent proceedings.'6 9
One court of appeals had held that in an error coram nobis proceeding
some judge other than the judge who presided at the time of plea and sentence
should hear the case.160
DIsQuALIFICATIoN IN CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, concerning contempt
proceedings, stated:161
The court is not a party. There is nothing that affects the judges
in their own persons. Their concern is only that the law should be
obeyed and enforced, and their interest is no other than that they
represent in every case.
However, if there is no immediate urgency it is "by far the better policy
to call in another judge; and the federal system provides special facility for so
doing." 62 The Supreme Court in a later case stated: 63
All we can say upon the whole matter is that where conditions do
not make it impracticable, or where the delay may not injure public
or private right, a judge called upon to act in a case of contempt by
personal attack upon him, may, without flinching from his duty, prop-
erly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place.
The Supreme Court has held in Sacher v. United States, 64 by a vote of
five to three that where defense counsel in a criminal trial was guilty of con-
158. Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949). See also Deitle v. United
States, 302 F.2d 116, 118 n.2 (7th Cir. 1962); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 453
(9th Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Bostic, 192 F. Supp. 170, 171 (DLD.C. 1961).
159. Palmer v. United States, 249 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1957).
160. United States v. Halley, 240 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1957).
161. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906). See also Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454 (1907).
The mere fact that contempt proceedings were initiated by a cohrt does not disqualify.
O'Malley v. United States, 128 F.2d 676, 685 (8th Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 317
U.S. 412 (1943).
162. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 237 F. 986, 988 (6th Cir. 1916), aff'd,
247 U.S. 402, 423 (1918). See also Cornish v. United States, 299 F. 283, 285 (6th Cir.
1924).
163. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
164. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), aff'g 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950).
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tempt of court in the presence of the judge during the trial, the trial judge may
summarily impose punishment at the end of the trial without trial by jury.
Justices Black and Douglas thought that the defendant had a constitutional
right to trial by jury, that another judge should have tried the contempt, and
that there should have been notice and a hearing and an opportunity to defend
himself. Justice Frankfurter would have required trial by another judge. The
delay seemed to indicate that a summary contempt procedure was unnecessary.
If the proceeding were under Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, there would be notice and a hearing. Rule 42 (b) provides: "If the
contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge that judge is
disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with defendant's
consent."
In the somewhat similar case of Ofutt v. United States,08 the Supreme
Court remanded the case for trial by a different judge. The trial judge had be-
come personally embroiled with defense counsel throughout the trial and had
made a statement to the jury indicating his hostility. The decision was based
on the supervisory power of the Court.
In the case of In re Murchison,'0 0 a state judge sitting as a one-man grand
jury under the authority of a Michigan statute, charged two witnesses with
contempt after one witness had given answers which the judge regarded as per-
jured and the other had refused to testify unless represented by counsel. The
charges were tried by the same judge in open court. The Supreme Court of
Michigan upheld the convictions, but the United States Supreme Court re-
versed on the ground that there was a denial of due process of law in a proce-
dure which allowed the same man who had interrogated witnesses in a prosecu-
tory capacity in camera to judge them on charges arising out of conduct during
the investigation.
The rules developed in this line of cases were modified by the Supreme
Court's holding in Nilva v. United States'0 7 that trial of a party before the trial
judge who initiated the contempt proceeding is proper under Rule 42 (b) where
the contempt does not involve disrespect to or criticism of a judge (e.g., refusal
to surrender records demanded pursuant to subpoena). Mr. Justice Black, dis-
senting, stated:
But at most Rule 42 (b) only permits a negative inference that a
judge who prefers contempt charges for violations of his orders and
who is intimately involved in related proceedings bearing on these
charges can sit in judgment on the alleged contempt.'08
165. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954) (6-3 decision), rev'g 208 F.2d
842 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
For a discussion of the Sacher and Offutt cases see Ratner, supra note 141, at 242-44.
166. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (6-3 decision).
167. 352 U.S. 385, 395 (1957).
168. Id. at 404.
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DUTY OF JUDGE
Upon the filing of the affidavit, accompanied by the required certificate
of counsel, it is the duty of the judge to pass on its legal sufficiency, and he
need not determine on the facts his own disqualification. 169 The mere filing of
the affidavit does not automatically disqualify the judge. 170 He has authority
to decide whether the affidavit is sufficient.
While the truth of the affidavit cannot be adjudicated by the judge in-
volved or by anyone else, several judges follow the practice of stating their
views for the record in some formY t' A court of appeals has stated, "It is not
inappropriate for a judge to set forth his reasons for disqualifying himself."' 7 2
THE SUCcESSOR JUDGE
On disqualification of the judge for bias or prejudice, it is not necessary to
designate another judge outside the district; all the judges of the district are
not disqualified.' 73
Thus, on the filing of an affidavit of prejudice against a federal judge in
Puerto Rico the Senior Circuit Judge is not required to appoint a federal judge
from the states in the First Circuit where there is already available in Puerto
Rico an acting judge fullly empowered to sit by designation of the President of
the United States under the Organic Act of Puerto Rico.17 4
VOLUNTARY RECUSATION
Even though the affidavit is insufficient as a matter of law the judge may
voluntarily refuse to hear the case on the ground that he is disqualified because
of personal prejudice,175 or to secure a speedy trial and unnecessary litigation
of side issues.176
An interesting example of voluntary recusation took place in United States
169. Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1913).
170. Behr v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 233 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 942 (1956) ; In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 927 (1961).
171. Cole v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 872, 877 (S.D. Cal. 1948); United States v.
Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1954); United States v. Titus, 122 F. Supp. 179 (N.D.N.Y.
1954); United States v. Lattimore, 125 F. Supp. 295 (D.D.C. 1954); Note, 79 Harv. L.
Rev. 1435, 1437 (1966).
172. In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 391 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
927 (1961). See also United States v. Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Pa. 1958); Freed v.
Inland Empire Ins. Co., 174 F. Supp. 458 (D. Utah 1959).
173. In re De Ran, 260 F. 732, 741 (6th Cir. 1919).
174. Benitez v. Bank of N.S., 141 F.2d 939, 941 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 324 U.S. 859
(1944).
175. Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., I F.2d 582, 588 (W.D. Tenn. 1924); United
States v. Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 80, 92 (D.N.J. 1954); Smith v. Insurance Co. of Am., 213
F. Supp. 675, 695 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
176. United States v. Gilbert, 29 F. Supp. 507, 509 (SD. Ohio 1939). See Cole v.
Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 872, 878 (SD. Cal. 1948); United States v. Titus, 122 F. Supp.
179, 181 (ND.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Gilboy, 166 F. Supp. 220 (MD. Pa. 1958);
See also In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 384 n.3 (1st Cir. 1961).
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v. Quattrone,'177 where the judge disqualified himself because a lawyer friend,
not of counsel in the case, asked him about the expected date of a preliminary
ruling and the date of trial. The judge emphasized that he was not required to
recuse himself because he had not been influenced. "In making this decision the
Court believes that it should consider not only whether what has happened
would actually influence the Court, but whether it might give the appearance of
so doing."
However, some courts have been critical of this practice:
The disqualification is automatic if the facts stated in the affi-
davit are legally sufficient. For this reason, it is just as much the
duty of a judge whose competency is challenged, to reject it, if un-
grounded, as it is to sustain it when adequate.178
APPEARANCE OF BIAs
The House of Lords has stated, per Lord Cave, that if a member of the
court
is subject to a bias (whether financial or otherwise) in favour of or
against either a party to the dispute or is in such position that a bias
must be assumed, he ought not to take part in the decision or even to
sit upon the tribunal.179
The mere fact that in the past the judge and the criminal defendant have
been long-time political and social friends and that the judge might therefore
lean backwards to prove his impartiality does not show personal bias. 80 The
concurring judges suggested that to maintain an appearance of impartiality
the trial judge might step aside; in that case he later did withdraw.' 8 '
It has been suggested that an expression of opinion on the merits of a case
by a judge could be strong enough to entitle a litigant to some form of relief. 182
Such demonstrates a lack of openmindedness towards a case, and impairs the
appearance of a fair trial and a litigant's confidence that justice will be done.183
WAIVER
In a federal civil case it was held that there could be a waiver of objection
to the disqualification of the judge.'8 4 Such waiver occurs, for example, where a
177. United States v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240, 241 (D.D.C. 1957). See also Smith
v. Insurance Co. of Am., 213 F. Supp. 675, 695 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
178. United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734, 748 (S.D. Cal. 1953). See also Rosen
v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 80,
92 (D.NJ. 1954).
179. Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath justices, [1926] A.C. 586, 590.
180. Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1958). For the case below, con-
taining a very full discussion see United States v. Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
181. United States v. Gilboy, 166 F. Supp. 220 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
182. Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias in the Federal Courts, 11 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 419,
419-20 (1950); Note, 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 349, 352 (1949). See also Leonard v. Wilcox, 101
Vt. 195, 220, 142 A. 762, 772 (1928) where the judge had stated that no matter what evi-
dence was presented in the second trial of the case his decision would be the same.
183. Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
184. See Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668, 672 (10th Cir. 1944).
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plaintiff has obtained the appointment of a receiver by a judge, and has argued
before him and submitted questions relating to administrative matters in the
suit, and then later attempt to have the judge disqualified on the grounds of
interest18 5 There also may be a waiver where interest of the judge is very slight
and both parties request him to proceed.18 6
REMDIES
Appeal
As of 1960 one study concluded that an appellate court had reversed the
trial court's determination that the affidavit was insufficient in only five cases.187
Thus the remedy by appeal is "grossly inadequate." 88
An order denying a motion for designation of another judge is not immedi-
ately appealable as is not a final judgment.' 89 When a final judgment is entered
an appeal as to the ruling then lies. The error of the district judge in denying
an application for disqualification may not be corrected by application to the
senior Circuit Judge to exercise his power of designation, but only by appeal to
the Court of Appeals from a final judgment. 9 0 In 1966 a court of appeals
stated:
The order thus being interlocutory, it is plain that no appeal lies
under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1292(a), or under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1292(b) in the
absence of certification by the district court and the grant of leave by
us.
191
Where on appeal the affidavit of prejudice is not set forth in the record,
the court of appeals will not reverse because of alleged disqualification. 192
Where, during a rehearing argument on a petition for naturalization, the
court commented on a letter which he regarded as having been improperly writ-
ten to him concerning the case and read a resolution of an organization which
cast reflection on the fairness of the court and immediately expressed indigna-
tion and denied the petition, the judgment was reversed and remanded for
185. Coltrane v. Templeton, 106 F. 370, 376 (4th Cir. 1901). The judge had pending
in the state court a suit by him against the defendant corporation. But see In re Eatonton
Elec. Co., 120 F. 1010, 1012 (S.D. Ga. 1903).
186. Utz & Dunn Co. v. Regulator Co., 213 F. 315, 318 (St Cir. 1914). See also
Lucas v. United States, 325 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1963); Adams v. United States, 302
F.2d 307, 309 (Sth Cir. 1962).
187. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921); Schmidt v. United States, 115
F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940); Morris v. United States, 26 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1928); Nations
v. United States, 14 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1926); Lewis v. United States, 14 F.2d 369 (8th
Cir. 1926).
188. Note, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 941, 982 n.146 (1960). See also Note, 16 U. Chi. L. Rev.
349, 350 (1949).
189. McColgar v. Lineker, 289 F. 253 (9th Cir. 1923); Baltuff v. United States, 35
F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1929) ; Collier v. Picard, 237 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1956) ; General Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192, 198 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 952 (1964).
190. in re Wingert, 22 F. Supp. 483 (D. Md. 1938).
191. Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1966).
192. Gallarelli v. United States, 260 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
938 (1958).
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retrial by another judge "in an atmosphere of judicial calm."'01 3 Where the trial
judge rejected a suggestion of the court of appeals that another judge sit, the
court of appeals then converted the suggestion into a directive .1 4
An appeal from an order striking an affidavit of bias from the files is dis-
missible for the death of the criminal defendant who filed the affidavit.' 05 Where
no affidavit was filed before or during trial, and an appeal on the ground of
bias and prejudice of the judge was dismissed, an order denying a motion to
vacate which had alleged only generalizations, was rendered by a different
judge, and affirmed on appeal.'0 6
Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to attack a decision on applica-
tion for change of judge.197
Mandamus
Where in a civil case the district court is proceeding to decide the case
on the motion of the petitioner, the petitioner cannot have the judge disquali-
fied by appying to the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus.'08 But manda-
mus was allowed when the judge was a stockholder in the defendant corpora-
tion. 99 The remedy of appeal exists as to an order denying the sufficiency of
the affidavit and should be used. 200 Mandamus and prohibition may issue as a
substitute where special circumstances exist,201 such as when several prosecu-
tions are involved.202 Mandamus may secure relief before trial, appeal only after
trial. The interests of both the defendants and the court may make mandamus
the correct remedy. Mandamus may be granted by the court of appeals, but
not by a single judge thereof. 203
The court of appeals has granted a writ of prohibition on the ground of
because of the judge's personal prejudice where it appeared that the judge, in
whose court a defendant's trial for helping to organize the Communist party
193. Moskun v. United States, 143 F.2d 129, 130 (6th Cir. 1944).
For another case in which the court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial by
another judge see Crowe v. DiManno, 225 F.2d 652, 659 (1st Cir. 1955). (There was
improper cross-examination of witness and comment on evidence.).
194. United States v. Ritter, C.J., 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
946 (1959).
195. Flegenheimer v. United States, 110 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1936).
196. Hibdon v. United States, 235 F.2d 49 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 'U.S. 900 (1955),
197. Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, 428 (1912).
198. In re Equitable Trust Co., 232 F. 836 (9th Cir. 1916).
199. In re Honolulu Consol. Oil Co., 243 F. 348, 353 (9th Cir. 1917).
200. Minnesota & Ont. Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, 70 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 1934);
Dilling v. United States, 142 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Hurd v. Letts, 152 F.2d 121 (D.C.
Cir. 1945).
201. In re Lisman, 89 F.2d 898, 899 (2d Cir. 1937).
202. United States v. Murphy, 19 F. Supp. 987, 989 (W.D. Nev. 1937). Deprivation
of an attorney's right to practice by disbarment may be a special circumstance. Gladstein
v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d 762, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1955).
203. In re Wmgert, 22 F. Supp. 483 (D. Md. 1938).
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of the United States was pending, stated to defendant's counsel that the defen-
dant is a Communist, and that he, the judge, regrets that the defendant's
counsel is defending him, and the judge admitted that he, as United States
Attorney, had prosecuted some of the defendant's alleged co-conspirators for
contempt for refusal to answer questions, and stated that Communists hide
behind the Bill of Rights and at the same time try to destroy such rights, and
that he believes the Communist party to be an illegal conspiracy to overthrow
the government. 204 This was the first case to grant a writ of prohibition in a
disqualification case.
In 1954 the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit denied a writ of
mandamus to prevent the judge from trying a criminal case.20 5 The proper
remedy was held to be appeal. Congress may authorize interlocutory appeals but
had not done so as of 1954. Hence, the defendant must be put to the expense
and inconvenience of what may prove to be an abortive trial. But the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the use of mandamus but found the
affidavit insufficient.2 08
In the third circuit the procedure on mandamus for disqualification judge
has been modified so that the judge, although named as a respondent, "shall be
deemed a nominal party only and the prevailing parties in the challenged de-
cision shall be deemed to be respondents and permitted to answer the petition 20 7
Petitions for mandamus "should allege that an unsuccessful request was
made for certification under section 1292(b), or why such an application was
inappropriate in the circumstances." 208
The all writs statute, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1651(a), is not confined to instances
where the action of the district court will frustrate or impede the ultimate
exercise by the court of appeals of its appellate jurisdiction granted in some
other provision of the law. As Judge Friendly has pointed out, "Once the area
for the use of the prerogative writs is recognized to be not so narrowly re-
stricted, we can think of few situations more appropriate for mandamus than
a judge's clearly wrongful refusal to disqualify himself.120 9
204. Connelly v. United States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951) (one judge
dissenting).
205. Korer v. Hoffman, 212 F.2d 211, 213, 215 (7th Cir. 1954). See also People ex rel.
Tinkoff v. Campbell, 212 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1954); Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 594
(3d Cir. 1958) (one judge dissenting); Albert v. United States Dis. Ct., 283 F.2d 61 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 828 (1960). Federal cases are cited in Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d
953-55 (1956).
206. Williams v. Kent, 216 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1954). See also Gladstein v. McLaughlin,
230 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1955); In re United Shoe Mach. Corp., 276 F.2d 77, 78 (1st Cir.
1960); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927
(1961); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 1965); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357
F.2d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1966).
207. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812-13 (3d Cir. 1965); Note, 113 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1310 (1965).
208. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 813 (3d Cir. 1965). See Note, 79 Harv. L.
Rev. 1435, 1441 (1966).
209. Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1966); See also Green v. Murphy,
259 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1958).
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Possibly this case will start a new trend towards greater use of mandamus
in disqualification cases.
One writer has concluded that up to 1950 no writ of mandamus or pro-
hibition had even been granted to disqualify a federal judge.210 Another writer
pointed out in 1960 that only one reported case2 11 had allowed mandamus. 212
In 1962 mandamus was allowed in the tenth circuit.213
Many commentators favor the use of mandamus to disqualify federal
judges. 214 The state courts have readily issued writs of mandamus and prohibi-
tion to prevent biased judges from sitting.215
On the merits it has been suggested that instead of having the trial judge
consider the affidavit of prejudice it could better be considered by the appellate
court on application for prohibition or mandamus.216
Even though mandamus or prohibition is denied, the trial court must
still pass on the affidavit for disqualification. 217
Where a senior circuit judge designating under section 14 of the Judicial
Code a judge to act in the place of one disqualified under section 21 of the
Code acts in the exercise of his legitimate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court can-
not correct any mistake by a writ of mandamus. 218
BiAs DURING THE TRIAL
There are many cases recognizing that a judge may become personally
biased against a party during the course of the proceedings even though he was
not so biased when the proceedings commenced.219 When such bias appears, the
courts have looked to the standards developed under the statute.220
It is not always possible during the trial of a hotly contested case
for a judge, however impartial he may be, to maintain in the court-
room that atmosphere of complete judicial calm which is so much to
be desired. We must not overlook the fact that the human element can-
not be entirely eliminated from the trial of lawsuits .... Critical re-
210. Schwartz, supra note 182, at 428.
211. Connelly v. United States Dist. Ct., 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951).
212. Note, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 626, 627 (1960).
213. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55 (10th Cir.), cert. denicd,
371 U.S. 915 (1962).
214. Schwartz, supra note 182, at 424-29; Note, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 1036, 1049 (1964);
Note, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 626, 631 (1960); Note, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 928, 931 (1959); Note, 3
Vill. L. Rev. 454 (1959); Note, 65 U.S.L. Rev. 68 (1931); Note, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 82
(1927).
215. Forer, Psychiatric Evidence in the Recusation of Judges, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1325,
1328 (1960).
216. Note, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 430, 431 (1916); see United States v. Flegenheimer, 14
F. Supp. 584, 590 (D.N.J. 1935); see also Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1439 (1966).
217. In re Greene, 160 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1947).
218. Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 45 (1913).
219. Note, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 941, 986 n.159 (1960); Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1435
(1966).
220. Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 465-66 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892
(1956); Blackmone v. United States, 151 A.2d 191 (D.C. Mun. Ct. of App. 1959); Wright
v. Mathias, 128 A.2d 658 (D.C. Mun. Ct. of App. 1957).
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marks of the court frequently cut both ways, if they cut at all. Col-
loquies between counsel and colloquies between the court and counsel
as to the rules of evidence are not ordinarily regarded by a jury as
serious matters or of much concern to them. An appellate court should
be slow to reverse a case for the alleged misconduct of the trial court,
unless it appears that the conduct complained of was intended or
calculated to disparage the defendant in the eyes of the jury and to
prevent the jury from exercising an impartial judgment upon the
merits.221
A bias which develops during the trial and is grounded on the evidence
is not within the terms of the statute. "But a right to be tried by a judge who
is reasonably free from bias is a part of the fundamental right to a fair trial.
If, before a case is over, a judge's bias appears to have become overpowering,
we think it disqualified him."222 A direct verdict was set aside in that case
even though it might have been correct.
In one case Judge Learned Hand stated that the trial court may have
exhibited indirect bias against the criminal defendant!
as the jury might have inferred it from the harsh asperity and dis-
courtesy with which he at times addressed counsel. It is difficult to
know how far this kind of thing influences a jury; or indeed whether
or not the outbursts of petulant irritation, which repeatedly marred
the serenity of the courtroom in the case at bar, prejudiced the
accused, they were in indignity to counsel which we should not pass
in silence, and in which we should have supported them, had they
shown less forbearance than in fact they did.
2 2 3
Judge Jerome Frank has stated:
Taxpayer complains that the judge at the trial showed such impa-
tience with taxpayer when testifying as to indicate prejudice. But most
judges, being human, sometimes disclose impatience when witnesses
are unduly repetitious or excessively detailed. Such displays of impa-
tience should usually be restrained in the presence of a jury. But, in
the absence of a jury, they are not to be taken as signs of improper
bias.224
In one case the criminal defendant contended that the trial judge indicated
to the jury by gesture, inflection, and facial expression, that he did not believe
the defendant's claim. The conviction was upheld, the court of appeals stat-
ing, "Gestures, inflection and facial expression are not automatically reflected
in a reporter's transcript, and an appellate court must rely upon what the record
221. Goldstein v. United States, 63 F.2d 609, 613 (8th Cir. 1933). See also the elaborate
discussion by Frank, J., in In re Linahan, 138 F.2d 650, 651-54 (2d Cir. 1943).
222. Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
223. United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1944).
224. Low v. Nunan, 154 F.2d 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Buckley v. Altheimer,
152 F.2d 502, 511 (7th Cir. 1945).
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shows." 225 A court of appeals has stated that the trial court's "tone of voice
cannot be reviewed on appeal.1226
The disqualification statute does not apply to events occuring "after the
beginning of the trial.1227 Imposing a heavy sentence does not show bias where
the sentence is within the statutory limits. Many events during the trial "relate
largely to the exercise of discretion by the court and in themselves alone are
not sufficient to show bias and prejudice."
A court has stated:
When the remarks of the judge during the course of a trial, or
his manner of handling the trial, clearly indicate a hostility to one of
the parties, or an unwarranted prejudgment of the case, or an align-
ment on the part of the Court with one of the parties for the purpose
of furthering or supporting the contentions of such party, the judge
indicates whether consciously or not, a personal bias and prejudice
which renders invalid any resulting judgment in favor of the party so
favored. 228
Where the prejudice occurs during the trial, there can be no change of
judge, but only correction on appeal.22 9
225. Vind v. United States, 159 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
226. Coupe v. United States, 113 F.2d 145, 149 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 651(1940). See also Peckham v. Ronrico Corp., 288 F.2d 841, 843 (1st Cir. 1961).
227. Calvaresi v. United States, 216 F.2d 891, 900 (10th Cir. 1954).
228. Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 466 (6th Cir.), rehearing denied, 235 F.2d 129,
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892 (1956). See also Lucas v. United States, 325 F.2d 867, 869 (9th
Cir. 1963).
229. Knapp v. Kinsey, 235 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892 (1956).
